This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.

This paper investigates forms of metaphysical vertigo that can appear when contrasts between humans and animals are challenged. Distinguishing three forms of vertigo and four ways of differentiating humans and animals, the paper attempts to achieve a perspicuous representation of what could be termed “the difficulty of being humans when we are animals”; or alternatively, “the difficulty of being animals when we are humans”.

A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are (...) presented with in visual experiences. It is widely accepted that we sometimes experience red for example. But exactly which properties do we sometimes visually experience, and which properties do we never visually experience? The third issue is which particulars, if any, we are presented with in visual experiences. Do we for example sometimes visually experience mind-independent particulars like trees? Do we sometimes visually experience mind-dependent, particular ‘sense-data’? (shrink)

RésuméLa théorie des expressions incomplétes dans Principia Mathematica, se fonde sur le principe déja appliqué par Russell dans “On Denoting”, selon lequel il est souhaitable dans certains cas, ?on;établir le statut syntaxique des expressions catégorématiques. Grâce à la théorie intensionnelle ramifyée des types, les expressions incomplétes réféientiellement pourront être logiquement caractérisées par un mode de dérivation principalement basé sur la quantification non‐objectuelle. Ľintroduction des classes cependant, n'est en aucune façon reliée à ce mode intensionnel de dérivation; il en résulte qu'elles (...) fonctionnent en réalité dans ce contexte comme des expressions pourvues de dénotation et ce n'est que par une analogie grammaticale que Russell peut les comparer, du point de vue de leur élimination, aux expressions incomplétes de Principia Mathematica.SummaryThe theory of incomplete symbols in Principia Mathematica is founded on the principle already applied by Russell in “On Denoting“ that it is desirable in certain cases, to establish the syntactical status of “categorematic” expressions. Thanks to the intensional ramified theory of types, the referentially incomplete expressions could be logically caracterised by a mode of derivation primarily based on non‐objectual quantification. The introduction of classes, however, is by no way linked to that intensional mode of derivation; as a result, they function, in that context, like denotative expressions and it is only by a “grammatical” analogy that Russell can compare them, as regards their elimination, to the incomplete symbols in Principia Mathematica.ZusammenfassungDie Theorie der unvollstandigen Symbole in den Principia Mathematica gründet auf dem von Russell schon in “On Denoting” angewendeten Prinzip, wonach es in gewissen Fällen wün‐schenswert ist, den syntaktischen Status kategorematischer Ausdrücke festzulegen. Aufgrund der intensionalen verzweigten Typentheorie könnte man die referentiell unvollständigen Ausdrücke logisch durch eine im wesentlichen auf die nicht objektuelle Quantifi‐kation abstellende Ableitungsart charakterisieren. Die Einführung der Klassen dagegen hüngt keineswegs von dieser intensionalen Ableitungsart ab; daraus geht hervor, dass sie in diesem Kontext wie denotative Ausdrücke funktionieren, und es gelingt Russell nur vermittels einer grammatische Analogie, sie hinsichtlich ihrer Elimination mit den unvollständigen Symbolen der Principia Mathematica zu vergleichen. (shrink)

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...) the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. (shrink)

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...) to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the “error explanation” is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...) can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim. (shrink)

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper (...) scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. (shrink)

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is the view that there is some concept Q that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...) problem of consciousness. It mischaracterises the problem by presenting consciousness as more 'colour-like' than we have reason to take it to be. The real problem of consciousness is, I suggest, that almost nothing theoretically useful is known about this phenomenon at present. I also explore some implications of this perspective on the problem of consciousness. Given the shape of the problem, I argue that we can't rule out all forms of eliminativism about consciousness. Nor can we rule out that future research will close the ' explanatory gap' that consciousness gives rise to. (shrink)

Language Use offers a philosophical examination of the basic conceptual framework of pragmatic theory, and contrasts this framework with detailed descriptions of our everyday practices of language use. While the results should be highly relevant to pragmatics, the investigation is not a contribution to pragmatic theory. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems, Language Use brings out the relevance of Wittgenstein's methods to fundamental problems in central pragmatic fields of research such as deixis, implicatures, speech acts and presuppositions.

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

ResumeUn énoncé p est nécessaire, selon Chrysippe, si et seulement si p est vrai et si, étant susceptible ?on;être faux, les circonstances extérieures s'opposent à ce qu'il soit faux. On s'appuie sur cet éclaircissement pour construire le carré ou plutôt les deux carres des modalités. Ce qu'il y a de spécifique dans la logique de Chrysippe, c'est que du nécessaire àľimpossible que non la conséquence est valide, mais qu'il n'en va pas de même pour la conséquence converse.SummaryA sentence p is (...) necessary, according to Chrysippe iff p is true and, p being susceptible of being false, the external circumstances prevent it from being false. This explanation is used in order to construct the modal square or rather the two modal squares. Something is specific in the Chrysippean logic: from the necessity of p we may validly conclude that it is impossible that not p, while the converse conclusion is not valid.ZusammenfassungNach Chrysipp ist ein Satz p dann und nur dann notwendig, wenn p wahr ist und falls p falsch sein könnte, die äusseren Umstände verhindern, dass p falsch ist. Auf diese Bestimmung aufbauend wird das Quadrat – oder werden vielmehr die beiden Quadrate – der Modalitäten konstruiert. Das Besondere an Chrysipps Logik lässt sich daran erkennen, dass von der Notwen‐digkeit von p auf die Unmöglichkeit von nicht‐p geschlossen werden darf, nicht aber umgekehrt. (shrink)

RésuméOn examine ?on;abord les termes explicites et implicites du contrat de justice selon Rawls. Ensuite on rappelle ľinterprétation ‘procédurale’ que ce dernier donne de ľautonomie kantienne et ľon montre ľinanité de cette interprétation. Cependant la doctrine de Rawls exprime avec bon‐heur une conception sceptique de la justice.SummaryAfter a short examination of the explicit and implicit contract of justice according to Rawls, the reasons afforded by him to give a Kantian foundation to the contract are recalled and rebutted. However Rawls's doctrine (...) remarkably expresses the main argument of a sceptical conception of justice.ZusammenfassungNach einer kurzen Untersuchung des expliziten und impliziten Begriffs des Gesellschaftsver‐trages, wie Rawls ihn versteht, wird die besondere Interpretation erOrtert, die er vom Kantschen Autonomiebegriff gibt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese unzutreffend ist und dass Rawls Lehre eher auf eine skeptische Auffassung der Gerechtigkeit zutrifft. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...) understood by a radically different type of organism; and third, in the sense that an experience cannot be "apprehended" or "observed" from a third-person perspective. I also show that these three claims have entered into two different arguments for his view that experience cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. By way of assessment, I suggest that physicalists have decent resources for responding to the second and third of Nagel's claims about the subjectivity of experience, but that they currently have less convincing things to say about the first claim. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...) understood by a radically different type of organism; and third, in the sense that an experience cannot be "apprehended" or "observed" from a third-person perspective. I also show that these three claims have entered into two different arguments for his view that experience cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. By way of assessment, I suggest that physicalists have decent resources for responding to the second and third of Nagel's claims about the subjectivity of experience, but that they currently have less convincing things to say about the first claim. (shrink)